HUMAN EVENTS

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News Section *Printed in Two Sections*

BUDGET: *A call for help* (page 1)
DISARMAMENT: *Stassen's last card* (page 2)
APPEASEMENT: *According to plan* (page 1)
SUPREME COURT: *Red Monday* (page 3)
STATUS OF FORCES: *Dulles vs. McGarraghy* (page 3)

Battle of the Budget: The struggle to cut the $71.8 billion Administration Budget has entered its final and most critical phase.

This stage — unfortunately for the strategists among the "cutters" — coincides with a relaxation of the public pressure which has fueled the whole reduce-the-Budget drive. The citizens out in the constituencies, noting the substantial progress already registered in terms of billions of dollars, have to a certain extent let up on their volume of letters, wires and phone calls to the legislators. Quite pardonably, they seem to assume that the battle has been won.

But real victory still hangs in the balance, because the forces resisting the "public will" have gone into the third and most dangerous stage of their efforts. The first was when the Budget was initially unveiled months ago. Then, it was expected (by the proponents of big spending) that the Congress would as usual yield to clamors from special interests for appropriations. But "word from home" stiffened the backs of the legislators — and the first phase ended in "spenders defeat." Then came the President's appeal over the heads of Congress to the public on two TV programs. That appeal failed.

Today, the third stage looms as the most perilous of all in the struggle for fiscal soundness. It is compounded of (1) pressure on the more susceptible members of Congress by members of the Executive branch, (2) confusion as various important pieces of legislation arrive at critical stages at one time, all vying with each other for the legislators' attention, and (3) the usual haste of the end-of-session time when both Houses seek to wind up business and go home. Then "blitzes" by the Executive or by special private interests often upset previous plans in the general melée of closing up the session.

Concretely, this "silly season" of the struggle has been marked in the past week by the passage in the Senate of the foreign aid "authorization" bill. Despite the impassioned objections of Senator Jenner in an eloquent speech on the floor, the measure was rammed through at breakneck speed and sent to the House. It contains, among other objectionable features, provision for spending about $2 billion on an International Development Corporation in the form of so-called "loans" — which, as Senator Jenner pointed out, would be repayable, if at all, in "soft currencies." This is one of the pet schemes of the "world savers." Some members of the House are now alerted as to dangers of this and other schemes embodied in the authorization bill. But, say the economizers, members in general would stand up against such measures if given the benefit of urging from the "folks at home."

Around the Congressional corridors, it is rumored that the "International Development" scheme was successfully promoted within the Executive branch and the Senate by a *sub rosa* propaganda group led by a prominent Toledo industrialist, Harold Boeschenstein, President of the Owens-Corning Fibreglas Corporation. This executive, a friend of President Eisenhower and an admirer of Ike's foreign aid ideas, has reportedly been working quietly on editors, publishers, labor unions and women's organizations in behalf of Ike's high foreign aid budget, and to no little effect.

Conservatives have further been handicapped by the illness — during the past ten days — of Senator Bridges, head of the Republican Policy Committee in the Senate, the most ingenious and powerful worker for expenditure reduction in the upper house. Senator Knowland has relied very heavily on Bridges' "know-how" in cutting appropriations in the past, and Bridges' absence now is a severe handicap to Knowland and the Republicans.

However, it is felt, if the public once more gets behind members of Congress who vote for cuts and threaten with defeat the "weak sisters" who recently have been wavering, the session may end well for the cause of economy. Senator Byrd remarked early this week that the more than $4 billion in House reductions "proves the Budget can be cut. . . . This shows that Congress can accomplish economy if it has popular opinion behind it."

The New Appeasement: Signs and portents, reported in recent issues of HUMAN EVENTS, have warned of a new and more dangerous appeasement of world Communist power. More recently unearthed intelligence

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— indeed in the past week — deepened and strengthened this pessimistic view of what seems to be afoot in disarmament and other matters.

The latest word from White House and State Department sources is that this course, already noted, is by no means any "stumbling into appeasement"; it is purely and simply "appeasement as according to prearranged plan."

For instance, the new nickname for the Bermuda Conference (with British leaders) in March is "the little Yalta." The story behind the story of that meeting goes back to some weeks before our delegation went there — when the delegation was formed and being briefed. At that time, a rather surprising and revealing incident took place.

Secretary of State Dulles suggested to the White House that Senators Lyndon Johnson, Democrat, and William F. Knowland, Republican, be taken along with the delegation to satisfy the demand that Congress be consulted on all such decisions. The suggestion was sharply turned down by Press Secretary Hagerty, who called it "preposterous." That, of course, was the brief "brush-off." The real reason is now leaking out.

For under no circumstances did the higher ups want the Senators along on what was all planned as a "big sellout." When Ike and Dulles got there, instead of discouraging Macmillan from desires to trade with Red China (as was once firmly believed in the Capital), the Americans actually urged him to initiate gradual steps for opening up such trade, "to set the pace and take the lead," so the U.S. would eventually have to go along. And the renewal of trade relations would be only a precursor to the granting of full diplomatic relations. Finally, after full diplomatic relations, would come admission of Red China to the UN.

The rationale of the "plot" was that if we first started to trade with Red China, then we would have to grant diplomatic relations. This belief, it is pointed out, was, and is, correct. For, in dealing with totalitarian states, a "free government" inevitably has to grant diplomatic relations if trade is to become significant. For instance, it is a little-noted fact that while we have trade and official relations with the Eastern European satellite Communist states, we have *no trade whatsoever* with two Balkan "slave states," Albania and Bulgaria, with whom we have no diplomatic relations.

In short, by this "little Yalta" at Bermuda in March, the way has been deliberately paved for eventual sellout to Red China. The President's remark — about the possibility of trade with China at his press conference on June 5 — it is believed, was no accident.

Among the press, the story goes that the question which elicited the remark was "planted" in the press by White House aides and that Hagerty, en route to the press conference with the President, briefed him on the question — and answer.

Hence Capital observers are awaiting some other statement or remark — as a deliberately planned stage on the way, first, to trade, then to diplomatic relations with the Red Chinese Government.

Stassenism: Important Republican legislators on Capitol Hill continue to voice concern over the current role of ex-Boy Wonder Harold Stassen. Stassen's activities have always been a cause of concern to most of the GOP, but his present assignment as "disarmament negotiator" is causing far more than the usual uneasiness. One lawmaker put the problem to HUMAN EVENTS in this way:

Last summer, in his attempt to oust Nixon from the GOP ticket, Stassen predicted that Nixon would cause the Republicans a "six per cent" drop in votes. Stassen's dumping operation turned into a fiasco and, with Nixon on the ticket, the GOP went on to take the election by 9 million ballots. The whole performance showed that Stassen's judgment of domestic politics was worthless.

But, if he failed so miserably in judging things on the domestic scene — ask his critics — how can he possibly fathom the intricacies of foreign relations, and the double-dealing trickery of the Communists? Obviously his judgment here will be worse, rather than better.

Added to this, the legislator continued, is the fact that Stassen is known to harbor still unquenched aspirations to the Presidency. His main desire at the "disarmament" conferences, in all likelihood, is to strike some spectacular agreement with the Communists that will impress the people of America. Riding a wave of "disarmament" fever, he might be carried to the nomination.

For these reasons, our source concluded, any agreement that Stassen might bring home from London will be given the "super X-ray" treatment on the Hill.

Atoms For Peace: First reactions of dismay to the passage of the "Atoms for Peace Treaty," on which the President insisted, were succeeded by less pessimism as experts in the Capital studied the complicated debate in the Senate (*Congressional Record*, June 18, pages 8509 to 8524). Senator Bricker waged a valiant fight, not only against the Treaty, but also in favor of a key reservation which he and many others believe would substantially reduce risks to our national safety. The amendment would give Congress control over transference of American fissionable materials to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The reservation lost. However, the Senate did see that no materials would be given away and, by fixing a very high price per gram, insured that in practice no foreign country would be likely to purchase them.

There is, it is reported, agreement among conservatives — notably Knowland and Bricker — as to the desirability of such a reservation as Bricker's. But

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Knowland urged that it be tacked to the Participation Act which implements the Treaty and must be passed if the Treaty is to be valid. Knowland said that if the reservation were attached to the Treaty itself, it would have to be resubmitted to the 80 participating nations.

The Participation Act is now before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, of which Bricker and Knowland are members. It is believed that the measure will be acted upon in accordance with their views within the next ten days. Conservative Senators, while preferring that there should be no Treaty at all, nevertheless think that the method suggested by Knowland would reduce the risk involved.

At any rate, atomic energy experts — on whom conservative Senators rely for guidance in this highly technical field — believe that if the Participation Act is suitably "reserved" as per Bricker's ideas, the verdict on the "Atoms for Peace Treaty" will be "not a defeat, but perhaps a partial victory."

Red Monday: Washington is still reeling from the Supreme Court's barrage of so-called "civil liberties" decisions, handed down June 17 ("Red Monday," as the date is now wryly commemorated among anti-Communists in the Capital).

In three explosive rulings of that date, the Court struck out at the Smith Act (case of the "California 14"), severely limited the investigating powers of Congressional committees (the Watkins case), and moved to restore ex-diplomat John Stewart Service (implicated in the famous *Amerasia* case, involving 1700 missing Government documents) to public esteem.

Denunciation of the Court's decisions on Capitol Hill was widespread. Senator John McClellan (D.-Ark.) spoke for most of the incensed legislators when he said that the Supreme Court badly needed some "lawyers with a reasonable amount of common sense." Representative Francis Walter (D-Pa.) also summed up the prevailing sentiment when he suggested that the members of the Court should "bone up" on what communism is all about.

Even more eloquent in defining the effect of the Court's work, however, was the response of the Communist party. In ecstatic front-page headlines, the *Daily Worker* greeted the Court decisions as "liberty rulings" and as "A Milestone for Democracy." The rulings, observed the *Worker*, "mark the definitive ending of the McCarthyian [*sic*] era in American life."

On the West Coast, Communist spokesman Dorothy Connolly was quoted: "This is the greatest victory the Communist party ever had." She added that the Smith Act ruling "will result in the rejuvenation of the Communist party in America."

The High Court's "day of infamy" came on top of ts decision, two weeks ago, that the FBI must open ts files to Communists and other defendants in Federal suits. This ruling, it was learned last week, is wrecking Federal prosecutions from one end of the country to th- other. Scripps-Howard reporter Charles Lucey, writ g in *The Washington Daily News*, quoted "one of the highest Government law enforcement officials" as stating: "The effectiveness of the FBI is all but gone if we must turn over these reports — and we use the FBI in practically every case."

As Capitol Hill begins to recover from the shock of the Supreme Court's rulings, legislative wheels have started to turn. Representative Walter has already introduced a bill to preserve the integrity of FBI files (see HUMAN EVENTS for June 8). Reportedly in the first stages of preparation is a measure which would formalize the scope of Congressional investigating powers (as established by precedent). This would be aimed at counteracting the ruling in the Watkins case. Still a mystery, however, is what can be done to offset the Court's hairsplitting, in its Smith Act decision, over "advocating" and "inciting" violent overthrow of the Government.

Some very grave thinking is going on, among constitutional lawyers here, about the future of the Supreme Court. One consideration — fraught with revolutionary possibilities — is this: of the three coordinate branches of the Government, the Executive and Legislative are subject to check by the people, via elections. Only the Federal Judiciary (the Supreme Court) remains free from popular check. Since the Court has taken to "legislating," why should it be the exception? James J. Kilpatrick, author of *The Sovereign States* and editor of *The Richmond News Leader* suggests that the Senate should be given the power to elect all Federal judges, including the Supreme Court.

Status of Forces: Amid the gloom and murk spread by the Supreme Court's barrage of decisions, one bright spot emerged in the Capital last week: Judge Joseph C. McGarraghy's ruling that Specialist 3/c William S. Girard must be tried by an American court-martial.

McGarraghy's decision is viewed as a major "upset." Close students of the legal history of the "Status of Forces" treaties believed that, in view of a previous decision (see HUMAN EVENTS for June 15), McGarraghy would rule in favor of turning Girard over to the Japanese.

While the ruling is greeted with widespread enthusiasm, however, interpretations of it vary. Because McGarraghy spoke pointedly of "constitutional" questions involved in the case, some analysts believe that the decision is an entering wedge for curtailment of the "Status of Forces" agreements themselves. Others feel that, since McGarraghy finally hinged his decision on the substantive point of whether Girard was "on duty" at the time of the slaying, the case does not furnish a base broad enough for an attack on the treaties.

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In either event, all observers are agreed that McGarraghy's rebuke to Dulles & Co. is a definite indication of the way the tides are running. McGarraghy himself is a well-known conservative figure in Washington. A former GOP Committeeman from the District, he led the D. C. delegation to the GOP national convention in 1952 that voted for the nomination of Senator Taft.

Widely discussed is the role of State Secretary Dulles in the case. Pressure from the Secretary, it is said, was formidable. Dulles filed an affidavit with the Court asserting that, unless Girard was turned over, "serious difficulties" would arise between the United States and Japan. Additionally, it is reported that Dulles urged McGarraghy to hurry his decision so that — if it favored Girard — the Government could appeal it while the Supreme Court was still sitting.

In the latter plea, at least, Dulles salvaged a chance to recoup his losses. The Government, sidestepping the Court of Appeals, is taking the Girard case directly to the Supreme Court.

In the light of the High Court's batch of "Red Monday" decisions this week, Washington will watch closely for any ruling on Girard. The question to be settled: will the Court's sensitivity towards "civil liberties" extend to American servicemen as well as to agents of Communist Russia?

Labor Front: A long-smoldering feud between the formerly CIO United Steel Workers and the ex-AFL Sheet Metal Workers is reaching a new intensity, exemplifying the deep bitterness still existing within the merged AFL-CIO. It involves the Burt Manufacturing Company, Akron, O., ventilating equipment maker which has had a labor contract with the USW since 1945.

Before the merger, the Sheet Metal Workers began sporadically refusing to install Burt equipment, because it was not made under an AFL contract. The boycott continued after the merger.

Last January, the AFL-CIO Executive Council set up a special three-man committee to iron out the dispute. The committee called on the Sheet Metal Workers to stop their boycott; they agreed.

This week, the USW made public a new letter from its president, David J. McDonald, to AFL-CIO President George Meany, charging that the Sheet Metal Workers actually have intensified their boycott since the special committee brought in its decision. McDonald cited five specific building projects on which they have refused, in the intervening months, to install Burt equipment.

McDonald said the firm has lost $5,000,000 worth of business because of the boycott, and that its work force has fallen from a norm of 300 to about 100. He said the dispute is "significant to the basic question whether the merged organization which we have created can continue to function effectively."

Profiles In Courage: The jury trial died on the floor of the House last week, and the Administration's "civil rights" bill rode to victory over the corpse. Such is the comment of many observers deeply troubled by the current assault — in the name of "civil rights" — on the cherished American right to trial by jury.

In the final stages of the battle, it appeared that Administration forces were so ascendant that only the "diehard" Southern Democrats would vote to attach a jury trial amendment to the "civil rights" measure. Surprisingly, 45 Republicans—and one lone Northern Democrat — stood up to be counted in favor of trial by jury.

The Northern Democrat was Representative Fred Marshall of Minnesota. The Republicans, only five of whom are from the South and five from border states, were as follows: Adair, Ind.; Alger, Tex.; Andersen, H. C., Minn.; Andresen, A. H., Minn.; Bennett, Mich.; Bow, O.; Bray, Ind.; Broyhill Va.; Budge, Ida.; Chenoweth, Colo.; Clevenger, O.; Cole, N.Y.; Cramer, Fla.; Devereux, Md.; Gross, Ia.; Gwinn, N.Y.; Harrison, Neb.; Hiestand, Calif.; Hoffman, Mich.; Hyde, Md.; Jensen, Ia.; Johansen, Mich.; Jonas, N.C.; Keeney, Ill.; Kilburn, N.Y.; Knox, Mich.; Mason, Ill.; Miller, Neb.; Miller, N.Y.; Neal, W.Va.; Nicholson, Mass.; O'Hara, Minn.; Pillion, N.Y.; Poff, Va.; Ray, N.Y.; Rees, Kan.; Rhodes, Ariz.; Robsion, Ky.; Rogers, Mass.; Siler, Ky.; Smith, Kan.; Smith, Wis.; Taber, N.Y.; Van Pelt, Wis.; Weaver, Neb.

For GOP Congressmen from Northern districts to defy the Administration on this issue is a real test of political courage — and devotion to basic principles. So runs Capital tribute to these "last-ditch" defenders of the jury trial.

ILO: The U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers this week put themselves on record as opposing any increase in this country's contribution to the costs of operation of the widely criticized International Labor Organization.

The Administration, for the third successive year, has asked that the maximum authorized contribution be increased from $1.75 million to $3 million a year.

The Chamber's opposition was presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by William L. McGrath, president of the Williamson Co., of Cincinnati, and himself former U. S. Employer delegate to the ILO; the NAM's, by a letter from its president, Ernest G. Swigert.

Both organizations urged anew that Congress make its own investigation of the ILO, as to whether the United States should remain a member or not. Many feel that the U.S. should withdraw because, as McGrath put it, the ILO has become "a propaganda forum for statism and socialism."

Opposition to continued U. S. participation has been growing since 1954, when the Soviet Union and two of its satellites became full members. McGrath and others contend that their participation makes a mockery of the organization's purported "tripartite" format, with separate representatives of labor, employers and Government. They say that all Communist representatives, regardless of their designation, are Government representatives, and — in the nature of communism — can be nothing else.

Letter from Frank T. Bow, member of Congress, 16th District of Ohio: "HUMAN EVENTS has made a unique place for itself by its consistent, sound and conservative appraisal of the news. I consider it absolutely essential for anyone who wishes a balanced view of government activities."

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Article Section *Printed in Two Sections*

President Eisenhower and Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery agreed last month that Generals Lee and Meade should have been "sacked" for mishandling the Battle of Gettysburg — thus reviving public dispute over their own roles in World War II. The controversy was deepened by the recent publication, in this country, of Sir Arthur Bryant's *The Turn of the Tide*. This important book, based on the diaries of Viscount Alanbrooke, Britain's World War II Chief of the Imperial Staff, furnishes an informed and often startling view of many World War II commanders.

The following article is a reappraisal of the issues stirred by these new developments. The author, Richard L. Stokes, is uniquely qualified to assess the Eisenhower-Montgomery role in Europe. A veteran journalist, he covered the European campaign for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, viewing the events he describes at close range. Stokes landed at Omaha Beach the day after D-Day, and made a practice of traveling far into enemy country with advance armored divisions. He has contributed frequently to HUMAN EVENTS.

EISENHOWER AS A MILITARY MAN

By **RICHARD L. STOKES**

As a soldier, Dwight D. Eisenhower was plagued by two grievous compulsions. The first was an infinite capacity for taking bad advice; the second, obdurate faith in counsellors proved to have led him into one mischance after another.

From the beginning of Eisenhower's command, Winston Churchill and General Bernard L. Montgomery wielded considerable influence over Ike's military thinking and his performance in the battle for Europe.

Through his ascendancy over President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill brought about the downfall of not a few American officers who seemed to stand athwart his path.

U.S. Major General Lloyd R. Fredenhall was sent home in disgrace to cover up British blunders at Kasserine Pass. For having ventured to be right about the fall of Tobruk when Churchill had been boastfully wrong, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers narrowly escaped court-martial. He was forbidden to serve in the Mediterranean and European theaters and was banished to Australia. Ike did not protest against these reprisals. It is not unlikely that, at that time, the Prime Minister could have forced the replacement of Eisenhower himself if the latter had not given proper signs of being in line with Churchill's ideas.

More significant than Ike's harmony with Churchill — his superior in the Allied chain of command — was his relationship with General Montgomery — his subordinate. The story of Montgomery in Europe is an illuminating commentary on General Eisenhower's military judgment.

In a conflict that exalted "attack," Montgomery was an old-line defensive soldier. An artist in a war of machines, he devoted long and loving care to polishing the style of his military masterpieces. His repulse of the German counterattack at Caen is credited with the saving the whole Allied beachhead from being flung back into the Channel.

But on taking the offensive, under Churchill's propulsion, Montgomery was given to crackpot adventures which came to grief. All were to the detriment of Eisenhower's compatriots in arms and of the "crusade" as a whole. They were to the detriment, as well, of Ike's reputation — for he accepted and retained Montgomery as his Commander of Ground Forces.

No critique of Eisenhower's victory on the Western Front will fail to observe that the Supreme Allied Commander was fortunate in possessing a spacious margin for error — supplied by the gift of U.S. production, a "two-front" war squeezing his adversary, and Hitler's folly.

Eisenhower also had the particular luck to be served by a first-rate fighting team of American generals.

Even so, the Battle of the Bulge finally snapped General George C. Marshall's patience. Till then the U.S. Army Chief of Staff had followed the American usage of allowing widest autonomy to commanders in the field. But now, years in advance, the ghost of Robert E. Lee was propitiated for censures to be publicized at Gettysburg in 1957 by President Eisenhower and Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery.

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After the Bulge, orders from the Chief of Staff required that decisions by our GHQ in Europe should be cleared through the Pentagon. Thus Marshall's pet protégé was curtly "sacked," as strategist and even as tactician. Eisenhower kept the title of Supreme Commander but was limited to the relatively humble chores of an operations officer. Until Germany's surrender Marshall ran the war by remote control from the Pentagon.

THE TRAGICOMEDY of Montgomery's European campaign, climaxed by the Bulge, was, from beginning to end, a revealing story. Montgomery had landed in Normandy with dual status. He was not only commander of the British 21st Army Group; by Eisenhower's appointment he was commander-in-chief of all Allied ground forces. General Bradley, commander of the U.S. 1st Army, scented "a British hunger for leadership." Churchill planned to skim off top kudos in the European campaign. Through Montgomery — Eisenhower's subordinate — he would direct joint victories resounding primarily to England's honor and his own. On the Westphalian plain he would gather the free world's combined power for an Armageddon that would make Blenheim and Oudenarde look like rustic skirmishes.

The scheme had no chance without huge subsidies of manpower and matériel — which Americans alone could furnish. They would oblige — if kept unaware that they were helping relegate themselves to second place. Utmost conservation of British lives was implicit in the design. By firm agreement, the prestige of Montgomery (whom Ike could have "sacked" any time he wished) as over-all ground chief would lapse when enough divisions from overseas justified an American Army Group. Maybe Washington could be pressured into righting this injustice. The Prime Minister fought tooth and nail, month upon month, to salvage the key spot for his lieutenant. General Omar Bradley's book, *A Soldier's Story,* explains why:

> **"Because of their shortage of manpower, the British bid for face in the European campaign depended largely on Montgomery's retention of his role as Allied ground commander. While Montgomery commanded all Allied ground troops, even those of the United States could be properly called 'Montgomery's forces' —for whatever the reference might be worth to the British in prestige."**

Pushed by the strong hand of General Sir Harold Alexander, Monty had exploited in North Africa the weapon of mobility. On his own, in Normandy, he reverted to formal, set battle-pieces. He would not attack except from overwhelming strength. His advance was by hops of seven miles — the range of his artillery — with long pauses to tidy his new camps and collect all additional guns within reach. Invasion charts scheduled the occupation of Caen for D-Day, June 6. The town fell 33 days later. By then, the hero of Alamein was the laughing-stock of nearly every American in France except Ike and his staff.

The British plot was revived — thanks to Eisenhower, who threw his massive authority into London's scale. Whenever possible, in fact if not in title, Montgomery was restored to approximate eminence as chief of ground operations. Overriding missions showered upon him. Yank troops were "loaned" to him without stint. (The U. S. 9th Army became a perpetual British chattel.) Units left free were immobilized by diverting their gasoline and ammo to Monty's enterprises.

The first opportunity to refresh Montgomery's laurels came in August, 1944. The Allies undertook to destroy or capture the German 7th Army, which held a rectangular area in Normandy. This was contained on the north by the British 2nd and Canadian 1st Armies.

With bloody infighting, the U. S. 1st Army mastered the west and south laterals. Montgomery opened his attack on August 7. For himself he reserved the credit of snapping the jaws of the pincers. The east side was to be closed with a push south from Caen to Falaise and across a 25-mile gap to Argentan.

With his usual deliberation, Monty spent a week in taking Falaise. Then he settled down for one of his halts, which lasted five days more. Field Marshal von Kluge, the German commander, improved this windfall of nearly a fortnight by pouring through the aperture, intact, the cream of his tactical forces — panzer divisions and S. S. mobile formations.

Following a sweep from Brittany to Laval and Le Mans, General George S. Patton, Jr., with a corps of his new U.S. 3rd Army, took Argentan on August 12. At once he sent tanks rolling into the gap. Summary orders compelled their retreat.

Bradley and Patton wrung their hands as they watched the enemy flight. Complaints to Eisenhower were unheeded. It dawned upon them that Monty had no intention of moving until enough Germans escaped to make the task inexpensive. When finally he sealed the exit, on August 19, tens of thousands of crack troops had got away and would have to be whipped a second time in the Bulge or Ruhr. For this classic of discretion, Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshal. Supreme Commander Eisenhower evinced no loss of faith in his British subordinate.

Loss of 19 German divisions at Falaise and defeat of the Nazi 15th Army on September 2, as it fled from the Cap de Calais, convinced Churchill and Montgomery that enemy strength in the West had ceased to exist.

Thoughtless of the Third Reich's recuperative potential, they dreamed up a gala jaunt across Belgium and Holland all the way to Berlin, where they would make peace and crown England and themselves with immortal fame. The circumstance seems to have been overlooked that our multitude of prisoners consisted largely of administrative troops who were sacrificed so that fighting men could escape.

Companion offensives in the south, where the foe was weak instead of strong, and resistance could be divided rather than concentrated at one point, were urged by American field commanders. To their dismay,

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Eisenhower chose the British plan. He reinforced Montgomery with Brereton's First Airborne Army and six of the U.S. Army's nine divisions. Gasoline quotas of the 1st and 3rd Armies were seized. Their trucks were hijacked.

A day dawned at Verdun when suddenly not a cup of gas was to be had. In full career, Patton jarred to a stop. That sector of the Siegfried Line was deserted. Metz invited capture 35 miles away. The strongest of its ring of forts housed only a family of Polish caretakers. Distant by a march of ten days flowed the Rhine, with little between to protect it. Patton's crossing was delayed six months, from September, 1944, to March, 1945.

Montgomery's progress through the Low Countries was unopposed but leisurely. The German High Command had time to rally fugitives from France to the homeland's defense. At Arnhem, across the Rhine in Holland, the Allied excursion crashed into disaster. One jump over the river, on September 20, cost the British 1st Airborne Division 6,500 out of 9,000 men. Unable to believe he had failed, Montgomery fought on for six weeks before admitting it was impossible to get his infantry, artillery and armor across the stream. On November 9 the drive for supremacy on the Westphalian plain was written off as a loss.

ACCORDING TO GERMAN testimony at the Nuremberg Trials, it was Arnhem that emboldened Hitler to undertake the Battle of the Bulge. In any event, three months in advance, summit leaders of the Western Alliance had notice of what was to come. During October, 1944, the Pentagon's G-2 prepared a forecast, based on pure reason, which was sent to President Roosevelt, General Marshall and General Eisenhower, among others.

The following points were made: Germans always react to defeat with a counterattack; without such an attack, in the near future, they have already lost the war; obviously, the offensive will strike at the Ardennes Forest, weakest link in the Allied front; under the logic of both strategy and supply, the effort will not make sense unless the targets are Liege and Antwerp.

This amazing exercise in analytical thinking was ignored.

Tactical confirmation was provided early in December by U.S. 1st Army's G-2, the chief of which, Colonel Benjamin A. Dickson, has been praised by Bradley as one of the most brilliant and gifted intelligence officers in the American Army. On December 11 mysterious build-ups of enemy armor and infantry were reported opposite the Ardennes. It was suggested that at least a spoiling raid seemed in prospect.

On the 15th, a report was sent by Colonel Dickson to Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, intelligence chief of the 12th Army Group. Through interrogation of war prisoners, Dickson said, he had learned that an attack in the Ardennes region was definitely afoot, and would start between December 17 and December 25. Bradley never saw the report.

It was suppressed by Sibert, who thought it just another trifle of alarmist nonsense. He even sped a reassuring message to the Pentagon, to the effect that the Germans were through and the war would be over by Christmas.

Proved to have been right, Colonel Dickson was shipped home under a cloud of august displeasure. Sibert continued to flourish in his job. He had been grossly mistaken, but had erred in the best company. On December 16, Montgomery bore witness to the faith held by Eisenhower and himself: "The enemy is in a bad way; he has had a tremendous battering . . . his situation is such that he cannot mount major offensive operations."

Both were taken utterly by surprise. Even as Monty spoke, the Ardennes sector collapsed under a veritable cloudburst of four German armies, comprising 36 divisions, seven of them armored with 600 tanks. Panic and defeatism swept through SHAEF in Paris. Out of that atmosphere came an order from Eisenhower transferring to Montgomery's command all Yank troops north of the Bulge — namely, the 1st and 9th Armies and their half million men. Except for the 3rd Army, Bradley was stripped of every soldier he had.

After the onslaught was turned back on December 23, Montgomery more than hinted at a press conference that his generalship alone had bailed out the American field command from a tragedy of incompetence. During the four days prior to Monty's take-over on December 20, it was Bradley who put steps in motion for preserving Liege and Antwerp. Hodges was to defend the Malmedy shoulder, Middleton and McAuliffe to hold fast in Bastogne and Harmon to intercept S.S. tank spearheads at the Meuse. Patton was alerted to break off his battle in the Saar and speed to Bastogne's rescue.

Bradley implored Eisenhower to prod Montgomery into attacking the north German flank as Patton was doing in the south. Monty — unchastised by Eisenhower — refused to stir for nine days, until the routed enemy was in retreat. Then he employed only American troops. The new Field Marshal was at pains to keep his own armies in reserve. He committed to the action a solitary British brigade. According to Eisenhower, Yank casualties in the Bulge were 77,000. The responsibility, of course, rested with Ike as Supreme Commander.

Churchill rewarded Monty with elevation to the peerage. Bradley's proposed winter thrust to the Rhine, with the 1st and 3rd Armies, was delayed 53 days.

SHORTLY AFTER the Bulge, General MacArthur's headquarters in the Pacific picked up a wireless message from General Marshall to Eisenhower. When decoded, it was found to be a scorching rebuke. The key sentence was to this effect: "You are much too weak to fill the position you are now occupying."

Out of tenderness for British feelings, Eisenhower passed over in silence Montgomery's slur upon American generalship in the Ardennes. Bradley demanded a showdown with his boss and West Point classmate. To

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an Eisenhower flushed and hot-eyed with anger, he presented an ultimatum. If he were ever ordered to serve under Montgomery, exclaimed Bradley, he would ask to be relieved and sent home. The parting shot was: "Ike, I've enjoyed every bit of my service with you. But this is one thing I cannot take!"

General Marshall appears to have authorized Eisenhower to go ahead with the technical preparations, already begun, for what turned out to be Montgomery's prize *gaffe*. This was his Rhine crossing of March, 1945. It was planned as the most colossal and superduper of military spectaculars. Treasures of time and money were engorged. Landing boats for tanks were brought up by trucks and trailers especially built to accommodate vessels 45 feet long and 14 feet wide. The air fleet was twice as large as the record 4,000-plane armada of the St. Lo breakthrough. Always Monty clamored for more American troops. He protested that Yank divisions necessary to his "show" were being wasted on a bridgehead at Remagen.

Without parade of smoke bombs or sea and aircraft, Patton slipped over the Rhine on the night of March 2. Not even Bradley was forewarned. Stung into action after weeks of delay, Monty crossed the following night. But his "epic" sputtered into farce. Eisenhower himself, ordinarily unmoved by his subaltern's blunders, seems to have been disillusioned. Churchill and Montgomery vanished forthwith as dictators of Allied strategy. (This may also have been the moment when Patton was marked for obscurity.)

Once on the Rhine's further bank, the Marshall-Eisenhower team swung innocently into Moscow's orbit of gravitation. They were governed also by a map charted at the Pentagon on the basis of formidable areas in Eastern Europe, with their peoples, which Roosevelt and Churchill had sold down the river at Teheran into Communist shackles. The double control explains why Simpson was prevented from taking Berlin and why Patton, halted at Pilsen, was forbidden to accept Nazi surrender of Czechoslovakia, with its Skoda munition works and uranium mines.

Military historians emphasize that Ike deserves no blame for failing to take Berlin and Prague before the Russians did — a criticism frequently directed at him by many who do not know the facts. Ike had no responsibility for these matters; he was under close orders from Marshall after the Bulge. And Marshall himself was governed by the agreement (see above) negotiated by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran.

But Teheran could not foresee everything. The military found itself with an independent hand for certain problems of moment. The British were bound by strictest conditions to provide a land corridor for American use south through their zone from Bremen. Regarding the Soviets, the watchword of the time was: "We can't do this to our brave Russian ally!"

The question of American land access to the German capital was left to Soviet good will. The Pentagon entrusted to Eisenhower the responsibility for securing an inviolable corridor to this immensely important city — a fact little noted by historians. Sitting down with his "friend," Marshal Zhukov — on whom much wistful speculation has been expended in recent years — Eisenhower arrived at a "corridor" agreement. Since Zhukov was such a fine fellow, however, the American commander satisfied himself with an oral, rather than a written, agreement. That misplaced confidence led four years afterward to the costly Berlin blockade and airlift.

THE SUPREMELY CATASTROPHIC decisions during and immediately after World War II were, of course, primarily political matters. These were settled decisively by such as Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, and Eisenhower had no word in, or responsibility for, the decisions. Judgment on Eisenhower in Europe and the Mediterranean must rest on his record as Supreme Commander alone.

Those in Washington who knew Ike in the Army before and during the war generally come to conclusions like those of Lord Alanbrooke — Britain's World War II Chief of the Imperial Staff. Alanbrooke's often pungent observations on Eisenhower are contained in the current best-selling book by Sir Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide* (Doubleday). As quoted in that volume, Alanbrooke says of Ike's military abilities: "It must be remembered that Eisenhower had never even commanded a battalion in action when he found himself commanding a group of Armies in North Africa. No wonder he was at a loss as to what to do. . ." (p. 430).

The British strategist criticizes Ike for placing "political" above "tactical" considerations — remarking that he had "little confidence" in Ike's "ability to handle the military situation confronting him."

Stating that Ike made up in "charm" what he lacked in "military ability," Alanbrooke delivers a judgment which — considering Eisenhower's position and responsibilities in World War II — is of grave significance: "He learnt a lot during the war, but tactics, strategy, and command were never his strong points."

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